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Bringing the Insights of Behavioral
Science to International Rules
Michael Barkun
I.

EFFECTS OF CRUMBLING SECURITY, POWER, AND
CONFIDENCE UPON THE ROLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw (1892-1917)

7HE PERIOD on either side of 1900 has exercised a morbid
%Wfascination for social and intellectual historians, not simply
because historians think in round numbers, but because at the turn
of the century fundamental changes in international relations and
in our ideas about them moved
to a level of visibility. There
remains the feeling that the
THE AUTHOR (B.SJ., M.A., Ph.D.,
Northwestern University) is an Assistant
twenty-five years between 1892
Professor of Political Science at the Maxand 1917 witnessed the crumwell School of Citizenship and Public
Affairs of Syracuse University. Profesbling of a century of security,
sor Barkun has written numerous articles
power,
and confidence.' As alin his field and is the author of the forthways,
observable
changes in pocoming book, Law and Order: Stateless
Societies and the Sources of Law.
litical arrangements had their
counterparts in the intellectual
sphere. However much international law may act as a determinant of state behavior, it is also
a system of ideas, tied to broad streams of general jurisprudential
thought and social philosophy. Through these linkages, law can
be anchored in the empirical world through the generalizations men
hold concerning human behavior. In other words, international
law can potentially be related to the world of sense experience in
two ways: through its effect as a factor in the process by which
international political decisions are reached, and through the relationships it establishes with the science and philosophy of its time.
On the political level, three developments haunted succeeding
decades: the end of a successful European balance of power; the reversal of the "Europeanization" of the world; and the recognition
that the state, of all institutions, constituted a threat to human
values. It is perhaps immaterial at which point one deems the balance of power to have finally collapsed, whether with the Crimean
I The atmosphere of fin de siace decadence and impending disaster is admirably
conveyed in TucrmlAN, Tim PROUD TOWm (1966).
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War, the Franco-Prussian War, or the First World War.2 In any
event, its death came by stages, such that it can be said to have operated with genuine efficacy only from 1815 to about mid-century.'
From then on, the ability of the Great Powers of Europe to equilibrate continental politics declined. Alliances ceased to be the products of temporary convenience and became rigidly held commitments. The threat increased that a single state could effectively
achieve continental hegemony without the other powers having
sufficient sense of community security to do much to prevent it,
short of a major war.
Again in retrospect, at the same time Europe was losing control
of its immediate political destiny, it was losing its hold over the
non-European world.4 The ability of a state to preserve its territorial integrity and if possible to extend its reach hinged less and
less upon the attenuated mercantilism of the imperialist period.
The possession of colonies ceased to be the "idiom" in which effective power was expressed, although the belated imperialisms of the
United States, Germany, and Italy demonstrated the hold the idea
still had. In fact, what mattered was an industrial and technological base and a relatively large population that could exploit it. The
significance of the Russo-Japanese War lay in the fact that Japan
established its power position through a manipulation of Western
technical skills rather than from a colonial base. England, heavily
industrialized from the early nineteenth century, began diminishing
in capabilities relative to Germany when, in the latter part of the
century, Germany outstripped England as a center of technological
innovation.5
Finally, whatever else the state was deemed to be, it was thought
of as the protector of those within its borders - indeed, as their
only protector. This view reflected the reality of a world of states,
but it also was reinforced by the energies of European nationalism
the belief that full human potential depended upon the coinciding
of national and state boundaries. The rude fact was, however, that
the state more and more appeared as the violator of human rights
at least as those rights appeared to Edwardian sensibilities.
2

For detailed descriptions of the collapse of the balance of power, see BINKLEY,
REALISM AND NATIONALISM: 1852-1871 (1963); RosEcRANcE, AcION AND REAcTION IN WORLD PoLITIcS (1963).
3
Barkun, Integration, Organization, and Values, in FUNCTIONS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS SYSTEM (Gregg & Barkun ed.) (in press).
4 MCNEILL, THE RISE OF THE WEST 621 (1965).
5Id. at 802.
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These violations were perceived, as might be expected, at the margins of Europe, in Belgian colonial policy and Russian and Turkish
minority policies.
These three tendencies had immediate international repercussions. But the line between internationaland intranationaldevelopments is never an easy one to maintain.' A reciprocal relationship usually obtains between activities within and between states.
Industrialization and urbanization brought their own problems to
the domestic arena, even as they created new international configurations. Consequently, when we look at the nexus between action
and ideas, it is necessary that we see changes coming out of both
national and international settings. Very real alterations in thinking about international law have been connected as much with internal as with external developments. The paradox is that the
structural differences between municipal and international law have
not prevented both from being affected by the same social, economic, and political trends.
Late-nineteenth century social and legal philosophy was permeated with a conception of linear human progress. Evolutionary
theory of one kind or another was the model taken for human biological and social existence.7 It was, in a way, also the behavioral
science of its day. That is a matter we might now dispute, since
the evolutionary theory of that era strikes us as a support for the
maldistribution of national wealth. Nonetheless, it was firmly believed to be the law of human life that societies moved, as it were,
ever upward toward more complex and presumably therefore more
advanced states of existence. That broad school of thought permeated the legal sphere. It became one of the channels through
which the behavioral science of the day entered legal thinking. For
this reason, it is difficult to separate social philosophy and behavioral science at that point in time. Certainly, from a purely institutional standpoint there was little in the way of an autonomous behavioral science. But, insofar as men drew distinctions between
what was true of the world and what they wished to be true, they
saw in evolutionary theory factual propositions about the way of
the world. For them, the Western state stood then at the apex of
a long human ascent
It is fair, then, to say that basic attitudes
6 See FARRELL, APPROAcriS TO CoM ARATIVE AND INTBRNATIONAL POLTICS
(1966).
7
A. KAPLAN, Tkm CONDUCT OF INQUIRY 384 (1964).
8
f there is anything jarring in Sir Henry Maine, it is that, as perceptive as he was,
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toward social institutions tended on the whole to reinforce a belief
in the essential rightness -

indeed, in the inevitability -

of a

world of competing nation-states. That this world was periodically
disrupted by wars was simply taken as evidence on a macrocosmic
scale of the struggle for survival that characterized life at all the
lower levels.9
This view comported fairly well with the observable world, in
which the West enjoyed the fruits of technological advantage and
where indigenous non-Western cultures and legal systems were effectively suppressed, modified, or ignored. However, reform was
in the air. A new empiricism had entered legal calculations, of
which

-

again paradoxically -

the evolutionary perspective had

itself been a part.
Two major jurisprudential revolutions over roughly the last two
hundred and fifty or three hundred years may be discerned. In the
first, positivism turned aside from the long, prestigious tradition of
natural law. By seeking legal rules in the sovereign's documented
pronouncements, the positivists moved legal thought onto a considerably broader stage, since it no longer depended upon the ambiguous testimony of human reason. Disparaged as positivism has
been since, it was originally a substantial empirical advance. The
second -

and more germane -

revolution moved beyond docu-

mentary evidence of legal rules to a direct examination of the relationship between those rules and society. In this effort, evolutionary theory itself played a part. By justifying law in terms of the
development of the larger social framework, law was freed from its
formerly exclusive concerns with its own substance and methods.
Further, the development of positivism had been quietly accompanied by the separate development of an historical jurisprudence.
Writers such as Savigny, Maine (both historical and evolutionary),
and Vinogradoff saw law as grounded in and affecting such diverse
social factors as land tenure, the kinship system, and religious beliefs.
This historical school was largely confined to Europe, where
there seemed to be profit in tracing legal origins. The social probhe felt that England and its world represented the pinnacle of human achievement. See
MAINE, ANCIENT LAw (1861).
9
Social Darwinism gave to war a status far higher than it ever received by way of
the traditional law of war. HOFSTADTBR, SOCIAL DARWINIsM IN AMERICAN
THOUGHT 170-71 (1955). A contemporary discussion of social evolution suggests that
global international law, as a manifestation of international integration, presents law at
a higher stage of development than does municipal law. Ginsberg, Social Evolution,
in DARWINIsM AND THE STUDY OF SOCIETY (Banton ed. 1961).
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lems of industrialized America suggested a different form of empirical jurisprudence, exemplified by Holmes, Pound, and Cardozo.
It is unimportant whether one regards them as precursors of "legal
realism" or as exponents of "sociological jurisprudence." Both
terms describe moods far more than definable schools. What is
important is that there was an increasing disposition to combine
legal and social calculations, if only because the apparent failure to
do so in the past had rendered legislation and court decisions irrelevant to the problems of an industrialized, urbanized society.
These writers, familiar enough, were not explicitly concerned
with international law; the problems of municipal law were quite
enough to absorb their energies. Their aims, however, proved to
be endlessly adaptable. In fact, they, along with the positivists and
the evolutionists, were part of the intellectual world of 1892-1917.
As such, they in part determined the shifting fate of international
law in this period, for the political trends discussed earlier - affecting European equilibrium, the world distribution of power, and the
liberties states took with their nationals - created some profound
intellectual difficulties.
The first of these was that however much positivists like Austin
might wonder whether international law really was law at all,1"
there was always a dear presumption that it existed and played a
role. In fact, much of international law was simply a codification
of the rules by which European states governed their intercourse.
As such, it constituted the "rules of the game" for the balance-ofpower system. 1 As long as that system prevented a continent-wide
war, international law was validated. Even the major breakdown,
the Napoleonic wars, only generated the desire to quickly repair the
system. But the major escalations we know as the Crimean, FrancoPrussian, and First World Wars gradually eroded the belief that
after a conflict, the Great Powers had simply to put the pieces together again and the system would be set right.
Second, the successful operations of the European Concert (itself a suggestive term) depended upon the ability of the powers to
communicate among themselves, depended, that is, upon common
terms and common values. So long as the arena to be considered
was Europe itself or Europe and its colonies and dependencies, this
was a valid presumption since there could be effective communica30 AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, OR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW
(1873).
11 AL KAPLAN & KATZENBAcH,

TIONAL LAW 30-55 (1961).

THE

POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNA-
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tion because there was some degree of cultural homogeneity. However, the slow but steady recession of European power threatened
the cultural foundations of international law, the foundation of
consensus taken for granted since the Roman Empire.
Third, the procession of human rights violations (more accurately, events perceived as human rights violations) to a significant
degree undercut traditional notions of sovereign immunity. Under
these notions, the inviolability of a state's territory was indistinguishable from its being a state; it was merely an attribute of the
state form of political organization. The gap was small between
traditional sovereignty and Max Weber's definition of the state as
having the legitimate monopoly over the use of physical force in a
territory." Furthermore, a series of normative judgments concerning the moral worth of sovereignty developed which dovetailed
with nineteenth century nationalism. It was these concepts which
suffered a rude jolt when state behavior exhibited traits at odds with
municipal morality, as in colonial policy."
The above three developments were by and large seen as incompatible with a unilinear conception of human progress. The progressive destabilization of European politics, while it could have
been seen in the long view as a transition to a yet more advanced
form of social organization, instead appeared merely to signal the
decay of worthy institutions. Thus the presumably empirical foundation of evolutionary theory seemed less relevant; nor was traditional positivism seen as an answer, for its attitude toward non-legal
factors was one of studied unconcern. The law was a system sufficient unto itself, manipulable through the rules of legal logic and
analysis and, from the jurisprudent's standpoint, effectively cut off
from social, economic, and political developments. The one obvious current of legal thought applicable to the changing conditions
of the period was "sociological jurisprudence," which was imprecise
and suffered from the general weakness of the behavioral sciences
of the time. The greatest limitation, however, lay in the fact that
the work of the American sociological jurisprudents took place
within the confines of American law; hence it was not immediately
recognized as a resource through which international law could be
kept in phase with its environment.
The immediate burden of keeping world law in phase fell upon
the community of international legal scholars, in some ways one of
390, 417 (1962).
13 See generally ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 266-301 (1951).

32 B NDIX, MAX WEBER, AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT
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the most interesting and unusual groups in Western law. It is difficult to think of any other legal area of the West in which the
smooth functioning of the legal system depends so much upon the
continuity of scholarship. Here, the line between the scholar's and
the practitioner's role blurs almost to invisibility. This, of course,
results from the customary character of international law, and however much custom is supplemented by treaties, the system seems
always to retain its original stamp. In any customary system it is
necessary to know what has happened in the past and what is happening in the present. Since rules develop out of accumulated practice, some way must be found to slowly alter the understanding of
the rules as practice changes. Therefore, a lag is always possible
between behavior and the rules that are supposed to regulate it. In
a "unicentric power system"' 4 such as a state, the normal mechanisms of legislation act to reduce this gap. In a "multicentric power
system" such as international law, the sheer diffusion of power
makes legislation on a regular basis an impossibility. Hence,
change comes by increments as behavior alters.
Subsequent to the publicists of the seventeenth century, it has
fallen upon international legal scholars to perform the function that
in non-Western customary systems is frequently performed by the
elders of the society. 5 This results from the fact that no legal institution existed under traditional international law to undertake
normative revision. As long as behavioral change took place at a
relatively slow rate, the mechanism functioned well, but the international perturbations of 1892-1917 exceeded its capacity to assimilate change. The reaction to this perceived crisis situation was a
strong drive toward radical institutional innovation. This was, of
course, the highwater mark for the movement to make compulsory
and universal the pacific settlement of disputes through arbitration.
The manifest failures of the balance of power suggested that force
be voluntarily read out of international affairs, and this the Hague
Conferences of 1899 and 1907 attempted to do.
In a sense, the dilemma can be conceived in terms of commu14 For the dichotomy of unicentric and muldcentric power systems, the author is
indebted to P. Bobannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, in LAW AND WARFARE
(Bohannan ed. 1967).
15 L Bohannan, A Genealogical Charter,22 AmlcA 301 (1952). The term "primitive" is the subject of endless misunderstandings. Anthropologists themselves dis-

agree as to the name applied to that class of societies they have generally examined.

"Primitive" seems still to have a considerable durability, particularly in the literature
of legal anthropology, and it is herein used solely to denote the subject matter of that
literature.
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nications. Elaborate institutional arrangements were not required
when nations shared a common set of values, even if those values
dealt only with stability and the preservation of the status quo.
Consensus on the need to maintain international equilibrium allowed policy-makers, albeit within limits, to correctly predict what
their counterparts in other states would do in particular situations.
Indeed, when international law has functioned best, it has served as
a predictive device, the imperative that "States ought" being translated into the forecast that "States will." This shared predictive
apparatus was buttressed by the communications network of traditional bilateral diplomacy, occasionally and in extraordinary circumstances further supplemented by multilateral diplomatic congresses.
Thus, the world upon which international law had been predicated since the Renaissance was perceived to be at an end, though
it would be foolish to pretend that historical boundaries can be

neatly drawn. The attempt to restore its efficacy through arbitration agreements masked the fact that the sources of future development were even then growing within the embrace of municipal
law. It proved to be the vague but more viable concepts of "so-

dological jurisprudence" and "legal realism" that brought international law again into phase with the environment it sought to regulate.
II.

SOME OF THE FIRST

RESULTS

OF THE SHIFT

TO INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSES

(1967)

A half-century has now elapsed since the aforementioned transitional period. With this passage a measure of disillusionment
has come, 6 for the expectations aroused by arbitration, the World
Court, and, for that matter, the League of Nations and the United
Nations proved impossible of fulfillment. In part this results from
the excessive desire for quick and substantial accomplishments, but
a contributing factor is that the more explicitly legal institutions
were constructed in frequent disregard for the demands of their environment. Sociological jurisprudence taught few precise lessons,
but one was certainly that legal institutions draw support from their
immediate milieu. This marked a reaction from the Austinian
premise that a legal institution prospered precisely by virtue of its
ability to impose its will on the world outside it.
In fact, even within municipal law, the role of physical sanc16 SToNB, THE QUEST FOR SURViVAL 8 (1961).
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dons is still frequently overemphasized." Consensus and acquiesence have surely played a substantial role, although their operations
are less strikingly observable. The frequency of mass disobedience
in otherwise stable societies and of competing pretenders to sovereignty in less stable ones' 8 establish the point that force is but one
of a repertoire of techniques and by no means the single most important one. It is, at least in principle, possible to centralize physical coercion in a state system; that is one way of defining "state."
Contemporary political science makes clear that this is merely an
ideal type and that in practice even a state concedes often substantial power to non-governmental groups and institutions. 9
If the foregoing is true of the state, it is all the more true of
international relations, lacking even the mythology of centralization. International relations is a "multicentric power system,"20
that is, power is widely distributed through it, such that a hierarchy of command is not even in principle possible. Even in the
eras of great multinational empires, the global distribution of power
always made centralization an impossible dream. The world politico-legal system has never been the state writ large. Rather, it
has resembled more than anything else the stateless societies of anthropological literature.2"
International law continues to operate in an environment different from that of municipal law because the distribution of power
is different. Whether the difference is one of degree or of kind, the
maxims and generalizations of municipal law have a diminished
utility in the refractory international arena.
Nevertheless, one
observation made of state law can equally be made of international
law - it enjoys a reciprocal relationship with the society in which
it is embedded. The more we understand that society, the more we
know about legal potentialities and limitations. In the past, as we
have seen, empirical knowledge of the social framework entered,
17 This theme has been developed by H..L. A. Hart in HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW chs. 1-4 (1961).
18 BRIToN, THE ANATOMY OF RBVOLUTION 139-44 (1952).

19 For discussions of pluralism in American society, see DAm., A PREFACE TO
DEMocRATic THEORY (1953); TRuMAN, THm GOvERNMENTAL PROCESS (1960).
2

0 See note 14 supra.
21 The structural similarities between international and primitive societies are described in Barkun, Conflict Resolution Through Implicit Mediation, 8 J. OF CONFLICT
RESOLmTON 121 (1964); Masters, World Politics as a Primitipe PoliticalSystem, 16
WORLD Pom'Ics 595 (1964).
22
Refractory, when used to describe a society or political system, means that for
every function a corresponding instituion exists. International Relations as a Prismatic System, in THE INTERATIONAL SYSTEM 149 (1961).
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as it were, by osmosis, from the rudimentary behavioral science of
the day. In part, this was due to the state of knowledge at the turn
of the century and to the vagaries of institutional boundaries, for
only in civil law countries did law and the behavioral sciences coexist within the same faculties."
Today the interchange of knowledge and ideas between international law and the behavioral sciences benefits from the growth
of international relations theory and the gradual blurring of boundaries among disciplines. By and large, international relations theorists have not been explicitly concerned with law,2 4 but they have
been vitally interested in establishing behavioral regularities, which
is to say, law-like behavior. Consequently, some of the most advanced theory, particularly of systems analysis,25 is predicated upon
the belief that states interact with each other in routinely patterned
fashions, even though from time to time the patterns change. The
idiom of the legal literature is not itself utilized, but knowingly or
not, these writers have come to grips with some basic jurisprudential
questions: Why do states behave as they do? Is obedience to norms
in a state's interest? How do norms develop? Another body of
literature focuses on the processes of bargaining and negotiation,
suggesting that scarcely visible mechanisms for peaceful accommodation exist outside of international legal institutions and frequently
even outside of regular diplomatic channels.2 " When the latter are
nonexistent or inefficient, the actions of states themselves become
the message-carriers of international communications.
Reality is a seamless web; hence the division of scholarship into
autonomous disciplines is an admission of our very human limitations of perception. We can only see a limited segment of the
world at any one time and never seem to grasp fully its underlying
unities. Unable to take the world in as a totality of interrelated
parts, we concentrate on "disciplines," sectors of it, in the hope that
thereby knowledge can be made accessible. But disciplinary boundaries must constantly alter to keep pace with extensions of human
knowledge. The division of the behavioral sciences into disciplines
and the division between behavioral sciences and international law,
2

a Villey, Law and Values - A French View, 14 CATHOLIC U.L REv. 158 (1965).
24 An obvious and eminent exception is Morton A. Kaplan, whose theoretical framework guides M. KAPLAN & KATZENBACI-,

NATIONAL
25
E.g.,
26
E.g.,
CONFLICT

THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTER-

LAW (1961).
the work of Morton Kaplan, Richard Rosecrance, and Charles McClelland.
IKLE, How NATIoNs NEGOTIATE (1964); SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF
(1960).
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rests upon the fiction that the world is divided in the same manner
as scholarship, i.e., that there are discrete mutually exclusive sets of
phenomena corresponding to each developed field of study.
As soon as we confront the contemporary relationship between
the behavioral sciences and international law, we simultaneously
reach the question of disciplinary boundaries. The question posed
until very recently was, What have the social sciences to contribute
to international law? Posed in this starkly utilitarian form, the
query often elicited uncertain, defensive replies. However, the
more we learn about the reasons that academic disciplines take on
particular institutional forms, the more irrelevant the question appears. In the first place, individual disciplines such as political
science or sociology are often unsure of their own boundaries2
Second, how meaningful is it even to speak of "the behavioral sciences"? At best, the phrase is definable in terms of how it is actually used or in terms of often irrelevant indices, such as the content
of pedagogy.
In other words, the boundaries that are seen to divide one behavioral science from another and the collectivity of behavioral
sciences from international law are largely matters of convention,
and conventions change. For those working on the frontiers of
any discipline, boundaries become less and less relevant. Over the
last few decades the systematic study of human behavior has made
the goals of sociological jurisprudence more than mere good intentions. It is now dear that disciplines are not distinguished by the
fact that each studies different "things." The problems of international order are now seen to cut across disciplines, producing an
interdisciplinary community of scholars from international law, in-

ternational relations, sociology, anthropology, and economics. The
greater the sense of common interest, the more likely it is that we
shall have something like a complete picture of the international environment, what might be called an "ethnography" of international
relations2
In retrospect, the absence of a dear understanding of the lawsociety relationship rendered international law vulnerable in the
pre-World War I period and the problems beginning to appear at
that time have understandably assumed greater proportions since.
International politics has been globalized to such an extent that its
27

CHARLESWORTH, A DEIsiGN POR POLITICAL SCIENCE: ScOPE, OBJECIVEs, AND

METHODS 1-17 (1966).
28

SNYDER & ROBINSON, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DECISION-MAiuNG

(1961).
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non-European manifestations are no longer simply extensions of
European rivalries. As Western influence recedes, the world assumes once again its multicultural appearance.29 The legal consequences of this are considerable, for a postulate of international law
has always been cultural homogeneity. The experience of multicultural states indicates that a common legal system either arises out
of common patterns of behavior across cultures or it is imposed by
force. There is a dilemma inherent in these alternatives, for the
former results in a set of norms far more rudimentary than proponents of international order have traditionally desired, while the
latter is a structural impossibility, given the configurations of international relations. There has been an evident time-lag between
international law created in a culturally homogeneous setting and
the current reality of a multicultural world. If, indeed, law depends
upon consensus more than upon force, this is a problem not easily
set aside.
Thus, the socio-political changes implicit in the world of 18921917 have created needs for new legal techniques. The ability of
international law to cope with a rapid rate of change has never been
great, but devices have arisen from time to time to ease its passage
through the transitional periods and to assure its future smooth
functioning. Two have already been alluded to: bilateral diplomacy through resident representatives, and the community of legal
scholars."0 The first solved a pressing communications problem
created by the Renaissance world of states closely impinging upon
one another.8 The treatise writers also formed an element in a
communications system, for they integrated current information
about state practice with an ongoing legal literature. But both were
predicated upon a relatively leisurely pace of events, when messages
could be sent back and forth between governments and scholars
might reach a consensus concerning change in international customary law.
Present rates of international interaction preclude full reliance
upon the dassical diplomatic-legal apparatus. We now see the
growth of a supplementary, multilateral apparatus centered in in29 A recent survey of the business of the World Court vividly demonstrates that
independent non-Western states wish to disengage themselves from Western values
and institutions when these seem to threaten indigenous cultures or place them in a
subordinate position. Coplin, The World Court in the InternationalBargaining Process, in FUNCTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM (Gregg & Barkun ed.) (in
press).
30 See text accompanying note 15 supra.
1

MATTINGLY, RENAISSANCE DIPLOMACY 5 5-70 (1955).
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ternational organizations. The genuinely revolutionary nature of
international organizations may not lie in their presumed function
as catalysts of international political integration, 82 but rather as a
means of pulling together norms and actions. Certainly it is the
most far-reaching development in international discourse since the
resident ambassador. The ability to conduct international diplomacy quickly among all of the relevant groups of governments
suggest a communications device at the level of efficiency that political developments demand.
If historical precedent is any guide, major changes in diplomatic procedures bring with them major procedural and substantive
changes in international law. Resident ambassadors required a set
of rules by which their work would be protected and routinized.8
It is also fair to say that in less precise terms this diplomatic revolution stimulated a general expansion of the legal corpus simply by
expanding international interactions. No doubt the relationship
was reciprocal: resident ambassadors were necessary because interstate contacts increased. But they also were causal factors, leading
to new types and magnitudes of commercial, cultural, and political
contacts. Indeed, the breach of diplomatic relations itself became
an index of international tension.
Contemporary multilateral diplomacy takes four principal forms
so far as law is concerned: (1) there is a developing law of international organizations themselves, 4 comparable to the earlier law
of diplomacy; (2) increasingly frequent use is being made of multilateral treaties, since the communications network now makes this
feasible; 5 (3) the aggregate total of diplomatic transactions has
increased, and this expansion of communications permits the somewhat more rapid revision of customary law;" and (4) improved
means of gathering and processing information on state behavior
and attitudes has led to a major attempt at the codification of international customary law through the International Law Commission
of the General Assembly.8
In other words, the problems of international law are more and more seen to be informationalproblems:
32 Barkun, supra note 3.
88 See MATTINGLY, op. cit. supra note 31, at 101-07.
84

BovmTr, TH LAw oF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (1963).
35 Rohn, Institutionalism in the Law of Treaties: A Case of Combining Teaching
and Research, 1965 PRocEEDIms
Am. SOC'Y INT'L L.93.
8

6 See Singer & Small, The Composition and Status Ordering of the International

System: 1815-1940, 18 WoRLD POLITics 236 (1966).

37 Hoyt, The Contribution of the International Law Commission, 1965 PRoCEEDINGS AM. SOCeY INT'L L. 2.
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What do we know about the international environment? How can
that situational knowledge be translated into legal terms? How
can rapid environmental change be reconciled with the incremental
change of customary international law? These problems are neither purely "legal" nor purely "sociological," and to so categorize
them would be to miss the essential common purpose of lawyers
and behavioral scientists.
It is in the nature of all legal systems to resist tampering.
Whether directed by statutes, past court decisions, codes, customs,
or a combination of these, law looks simultaneously forward and
back. The necessary element of temporal continuity takes on the
appearance of an obstacle when events themselves create discontinuities. Law in general assumes that past, present, and future
will differ from each other only in marginal respects. Law itself
is presumed to help assure that change does not get out of hand.
Even in municipal systems where law takes an innovative role, the
innovation only affects small sections of the law at any time, leaving the body of it intact. Consequently, the legal system always
appears at a disadvantage when societal change begins to overwhelm it. That is what has happened in international law since
the late nineteenth century. Through a new capacity of the international legal system to collect and absorb new data about its environment, it may well be possible to bring the "is" and "ought"
of international relations once more into meaningful juxtaposition.
III.

COMMON VALUES AS THE BASIS FOR ONE
OR SEVERAL "INTERNATIONAL LAWs" (1968-1992)

It is a perilous business to gaze into the future, whether one
looks one year or twenty-five years ahead. Consequently, it is well
to make clear at the outset what can and cannot be said predictively
the more so because the behavioral sciences speak so often about
the dual tasks of explanation and prediction. It is one thing to say
that if certain circumstances occur, certain other events or characteristics will be observed, and quite another to trace the outlines of
events at some specified future time. In principle, explanation of
the first variety need not refer to future events at all but can be
used to "predict" events in the past, so-called "retrodiction."'
To
say "if this, then that" is simply to assert an association between
one circumstance and another, hoping always that the association
38

A. KAPLAN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 349.
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is sufficiently general so that it will hold true in the future as well
as in the past and present.
What follows is the second type, and it is in the nature of a
forecast, not a scientific prediction,"a or, to use Bertrand de Jouvenel's vivid phrase, an exercise in "the art of conjecture."4 Hopefully, it is conjecture grounded on some sound picture of the present. In any case, we shall be looking at some problems implicit in
the earlier sections, along with some educated guesses about the
paths international law and the behavioral sciences are likely to
take over the next quarter-century. At best, it is possible only to
chart some "alternative futures," by no means exhaustive of future
potentialities, but indicative of the configurations we can perceive
in a state of frustratingly incomplete knowledge.
One problem posed at the turn of the century and manifestly
present now, still goes in search of an answer. That is how to
cope with the increasingly multicultural character of international
relations. It might well be argued that the paraphernalia of multilateral diplomacy cannot survive it any better than the World
Court, that institutions share vulnerabilities, and that the hopes expressed for multilateral communication require a level of understanding not yet present. It is, however, also suggested that international organizations themselves socialize states to a common
system of values.4 ' Thus, international organizations, by providing
opportunities for diplomats to function together, develop in their
participants a vested interest - both material and emotional - in
a minimal level of international amity. The United Nations proper
is then differentiated from the World Court because it has provided
interaction opportunities which the Court has not. Then, too, the
same states that interact organizationally may also pursue economic
and social ties.
This is surmise; the balance is not decisively tipped in either
direction. There is much to be said for a healthy skepticism with
regard to institutional potentials4
Of all areas of international
relations, diplomatic norms seem the lowest common denominator
89 See generally Sibley, The Limitations of Behavioralism, in THE IMITs OF BEHAviORA.uSm IN PoLTCAL ScamcE 68,83-87 (Charlesworth ed. 1962).
4
0 DEJOUVENBL, THE ART Op CONJECTURE (1967).
41
Alger, Decision-Making Theory and Huaan Conflict, in Tim NATURE Op HuMAN CONFLICT 274 (McNeil ed. 1965).
42
Generally, the more complex a society, the more varied and complex its institutions. The failure to recognize the difference in complexity between international and
national societies has led to the construction of elaborate but poorly based international
institutions.
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with the ability to bridge considerable cultural gaps. The possibilities thus are twofold. The first is that international organizations and multilateral diplomacy may in fact generate a world political culture sufficiently strong to supplant the earlier one provided
by European expansion. The second, and less remarked upon,
possibility is that in the future it will no longer be accurate to talk
about international law in the singular but of international laws.
We have since the Middle Ages been in thrall to the ideal of
global law, transmitted from the Roman Empire. There has been
the persistent image of a golden age to be recaptured when Europe,
the "known world," was one. In such diverse forms as the Roman
Empire, Christendom, the Holy Roman Empire, natural law, and
international law, this ideal has remained alive, and traditional international law has always been assumed to be globally valid.
As difficult as it is to wrench free from a concept as elevated
as this, it seems necessary that over the next few decades we will
have to do so, should the current international institutional apparatus prove unable to deal with cultural diversity. The possibility
therefore exists that some areas of international law - e.g., diplomatic representation - will remain virtually global in extent, but
in addition to these there can be regional international legal systems, some of which may overlap. A world of "diverse public orders"'4S repays empirical relevance for additional complexity. It
also suggests that the traditional division between international and
comparative law may not in the long run prove tenable. We may
find it necessary to conceive international law as being at least in
part culturally determined, not the product of a single value consensus or of unaided human reason. Wherever states habitually
interact, an international law will develop. From the standpoint
of the behavioral sciences, the resources with which to understand
this kind of world are meager. It requires a law-mapping, the division of the earth's surface into legally homogeneous regions, that
has yet to be systematically undertaken." A world of diverse orders
also suggests that for the future it may prove disadvantageous to
deal separately with states' internal and external affairs. Already,
political scientists find it less and less meaningful to speak of discrete fields of "comparative politics" and "international relations."
Surely domestic developments constrain or liberate a government in
43 See McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems
of Public Order, 53 AM. J. bNT'L L. 1 (1959).
44 One of the few systematic common law attempts to do so is WIGMoRE, A PANORAMA OF THE WOL-D'S LEGAL SYSTEMS (1928).
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its conduct of foreign relations, just as international relations determine the domestic allocation of resources, the degree of permissible
dissent, and political stability.45
We thus return to an idea touched upon earlier,46 that the flow
of ideas about law is often across rather than within conventional
lines. Calls for "sociological jurisprudence" and "legal realism"
were made in response to the internal problems of industrialized
societies, yet they in time were extended to international law. For
example, the growing international law of human rights would be
literally inconceivable without prior extension of protections within
municipal legal systems. There is a spillover effect at work, a transfer of norms from the intrastate to the interstate sphere. This may
allow for the accurate forecasting of: (1) shifts in the boundaries
and content of global and regional international legal systems; (2)
opportunities for planned international legal change; and (3) international legal requirements. Further, the socialization potential of
international organizations and of communications media might in
certain situations produce a degree of world cultural "levelling';
industrialization can reduce economic and political discrepancies;'
and, finally, if regional legal systems are found to be divided from
one another along cultural, economic, or political lines, it may be
possible to discover internal trends which presage either the merging or fissioning of systems. The present crisis of cultural diversity
could have been predicted in this manner. We are now prone to
see customary law as the outgrowth of behavior.48 Without denying the basic truth of this assertion, additional factors concerning the
internal characteristics of the states involved might have to be added
before we have a full understanding of "norm-building' situations.
As we have seen, attempts to consciously manipulate the international legal system have achieved mixed results. More than brilliant legal draftsmanship is necessary for success. Even genuinely
innovative aspects of the United Nations system, such as the International Law Commission, are in a constantly precarious position.
Nonetheless, fuller knowledge of the law-society relationship can
allow the exploitation of certain leeways. In a sense, it has always
45
On the relationship between internal and external conflict, see Rummel, Testing
Some Possible Predictors of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1 PEACE
RESEARCH SOC'Y INT'x. PAPERS 79 (1964).

40

See text accompanying note 28 supra.

-4 The economic and social conditions for democracy are analyzed in LiPsmT, PoLIncAL MAN 45-96 (1960 ed.).
48 GODBNOUGH, COOPERATION IN C-ANGE 254 (1963).
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been possible to achieve modest conscious legal changes through
treaties.
So long as these remained bilateral instruments, the areas
they covered were small. Multilateral changes in legal relationships, however, demand a fuller knowledge of what can and cannot
be accomplished outside the dominant customary framework. It is
not always realistic to expect states to support internationally what
they do not acquiese in domestically. Since this is the case, it may
well turn out that in certain substantive areas attempts at conscious
legal change have been overly ambitious, while in others the system may be considerably more tolerant of conscious alterations.
In light of the fact that internal characteristics determine what
a state can and cannot do vis-a-vis other states, it ought to be possible to gauge international legal needs in advance. For example,
Western Europe after World War II was ready for a high degree of economic integration, with a correspondingly complex system of international legal regulation; it does not now seem ready to
carry this integration into the unambiguously political sphere." If
the latter forecast is true, further attempts at European integration
would be temporarily fruitless. In any event, the readiness of
groups of states to form new legal relationships may well be dependent on internally generated capacities to enter into ties with others.
This suggests that any anticipation of future legal needs is dependent upon recognition of the tie between internal politics and law
on the one hand and international politics and law on the other
(again, maintaining the heterodox position that international law
need not presume to global validity).
Those customary legal systems that work best are those that
need to change the least. That is why, despite the structural similarities between primitive and international politics, primitive law
seems to function so much more efficiently than its international
counterpart. International law is likely in the immediate future
not to be able to return to any imagined past of unity and global
incremental change. Whatever the nobility of the motives behind
them, attempts to centralize legal decision-making have largely
failed, for it is impossible to centralize decisions in a system without a center. The United Nations has functioned intermittently for
the purpose of achieving consensus and exchanging messages but
hardly after the manner of a national government. Since our abil49 See generally Rohn, supra note 35.
50 See Deutsch, A Suammary Report, Integration and Arms Control in the European
Political Environment, 60 AM. POL. SCL REV. 354 (1966).
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ity to deal with international order in this conventional way is so
limited, it seems prudent to accept rather than fight against the
structural constraints of international relations. Consequently, the
time may be coming when we must either retain our attachment to
global law and accept its immediate unattainability or abandon it
in favor of normative decentralization that can achieve success in
circumscribed geographical and substantive areas.
It has often been said that nations can accept all manner of laws
that do not affect their "vital interests." Another way of putting
it is that "non-political" laws are the only ones that are politically
palatable. Laws regulating international economic processes have
been among the most long-lived and successful, perhaps for this
very reason. Is it likely that international law of this type will expand or contract over the next twenty-five years? But when is law
"non-political"? For a long time, after all, American constitutional
law was thought to inhabit a realm above politics. From a rule-ofthumb standpoint, we say that international law that is readily accepted is non-political and that whatever is controversial is political.
In other words, the test in practice is agreement rather than substantive characteristics of particular rules. This suggests that there is a
flexibility available in the "politicization" of rules of law.
Rules can be given a non-controversial appearance when legal
questions hinge on technical expertise. This is familiar enough in
American law, with the increasing use of expert witnesses. It is
likely to increase also in international law. This is one point at
which technological change reinforces rather than undercuts legal
efficiency. More and more conflict situations depend - or, more
accurately, are perceived to depend - upon the judgment of nonlawyers. The "depoliticization" of legal problems occurs when the
legal corpus itself and its manipulative techniques are deemed insufficient for a solution, and when the parties both agree that the
determinative facts and decisions lie in non-legal areas. The role
of the expert here is in general an unstudied one,5 perhaps because
in a society of experts the phenomenon is taken for granted. In
any event, the physicist becomes a significant legal actor when his
opinion is sought on the provisions of a disarmament treaty, just as
the psychiatrist has been in municipal legal systems. The effect of
deference to the opinions of experts is to blunt controversy. The
conversion process at work makes the lawyer into simply another
51

But see Kelly, The Expert as Historical Actor, 92 DAEDALus 529 (1963).
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layman and turns legally conceptualized issues into problems susceptible of non-legal, usually scientific, forms of analysis.
Again, we see the transfer from municipal to international law,
the growth of new forms of accepted evidence, and new reliance
on non-legal experts in national contexts, followed by their adoption in international contexts. The entr6e they have had into the
courts has been in the order in which their disciplines have achieved
society's respect, beginning with the physical and life sciences and
eventually including the behavioral sciences, beginning with economics and psychology and only in recent years extending to sociology and political science. Now, obviously the transfer to the
international sphere which we are likely to witness will work some
changes in this process. The major arena of public international
law is diplomacy, not the courts. Thus it is much less easy to measure the ingress of non-legal experts into the system, for they make
themselves felt throughout the policy-setting process."
It is fair to say that the role of the expert will be more prominent in international than in national law. Because power is diffused internationally, no single state or institution has been able to
make normative choices that all other states regard as binding. In
the absence of true legislation, the ability to make apparently factual choices becomes significant. He who has it within him to say
what is, thereby determines in large part what ought to be, for he
determines which customary rule is to be invoked. States willingly
bow to objective knowledge where they would never dream of submitting to the mere "national interests" of other states. It is likely,
then, that over the next few decades behavioral scientists, already receiving a hearing in some national courts, will become increasingly
prominent in the shaping of attitudes toward international rules of
conduct. Inevitably, however, the insertion of behavioral science
expertise into the international legal process will assume a form
different from that in municipal law, for more than an alteration in
evidentiary practice is required. It is unlikely that international
tribunals will, over the next quarter-century, assume a position substantially more prominent than the one they presently occupy.
What is likely is that new kinds of data will enter the policy-making
process.
It is unduly arbitrary to draw a sharp line between policy and
law, for law is policy, expressed in a technically precise manner in
order to achieve predictable future behavior in oneself and others.
5

2 See WITE, THE USE OF EXPERTS BY INTERNAIONAL TRIBUNALS (1965).
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Consequently, the addition of behavioral science materials and personnel at policy-making levels in no way limits their legal effectiveness.
Furthermore, it should in the future be possible to predict
within tolerable limits the kinds of rules different states are likely
to observe under stated circumstances. If it is impossible to engage
in experiments upon the substance of international relations to make
such determinations, the technology of simulation provides a promising substitute.5 8 The inability to accurately predict the success of
international legal institutions turns out not to be an absolute limitation. While states do not lend themselves to the experimental
manipulations of the behavioral sciences, "surrogate international
systems" do. In effect, we can create operating miniatures of international relations in the laboratory, incorporating premises previously culled from direct observations. Utilizing either individuals
in the role of decisions-makers or computers manipulating information in a like manner or perhaps through a combination of the two,
the patterns of international conduct can be represented with a
strikingly high degree of verisimilitude. To the present time, simulation techniques have been taken up for their ability to illuminate economic behavior, to study markets; national politics, to chart
the course of political campaigns; pedagogy, to stimulate student
empathy with policy-makers and to sharpen the judgment of policymakers themselves; and international relations research, to develop
and, hopefully, to test hypotheses concerning international politics.
As more and more explicitly legal elements are built into international simulations, it will become feasible to answer some currently obscure problems in the gray area shared by law and politics:
What constraints does international law place upon national policy
decisions? In what situations is international law most meaningfully invoked? Are there areas of state behavior amenable to legal
regulation which have hitherto been ignored? The meshing of
disciplines which this portends will eventually produce a radically
altered concept of international law. In the past, international law
was defined solely in terms of a dearly bounded field of study,
rather than in terms of certain patterns of behavior. Conversely,
political scientists, whenever they studied constraints upon state be53 See generally GuBTKow, SIMULATION IN SOCrAL SCIENCE: READINGS (1962);
GuErzKow, ALGER, BRODY, NORTH & SNYDER, SIMULATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: DEVELOPMENTS FOR RiESEARCH AND TEACHING (1963). The apparent absence of international law from international simulations is discussed in Coplin, InterNation Simulation and Contemporary Theories of International Relations, 60 AM.
POL Scr. REV. 562, 576 (1966).
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havior and the persistent patterns of international politics, dealt
Political science,
with international law without calling it such.
too, succumbed to the belief that its objects of study were unique
to itself. It is now dear that international order is a matter of concem to many disciplines, even when verbal conventions demand
that it be given different labels. The behavioral science tendencies
of the 1960's suggest the growing disillusionment with arbitrary
lines of demarcation between disciplines. " Consequently, a synthesis of mainstream legal materials with the insights of other fields
concerning the generation of normative patterns of behavior between states will become the hallmark of international law over
the short-term future.
54 For example, one of the most important recent attempts to understand the genesis of international norms barely mentions the word "law." SCHELING, op. cit. supra
note 26.
55An example already exists in the publication by the University of Michigan's
Center for Research on Conflict Resolution of its Journal of Conflict Resolution. The
American Society of International Law has in process a bibliography of behavioral science materials on international order: GOULD & BARKUN, Tim ScmN E OF ORDER

(forthcoming).

